Northern Illinois University

Huskie Commons
Faculty Peer-Reviewed Publications

Faculty Research, Artistry, & Scholarship

10-1-2011

Cultural Surprises as Sources of Sudden, Big Policy Change
Brendon Swedlow

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/allfaculty-peerpub

Original Citation
Swedlow, Brendon. "Cultural Surprises as Sources of Sudden, Big Policy Change," PS: Political Science &
Politics, [in symposium on A Cultural Theory of Politics], Vol. 44, Issue 4 (October 2011) pp 736-739.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Research, Artistry, & Scholarship at Huskie
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Peer-Reviewed Publications by an authorized administrator
of Huskie Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

PS: Political Science & Politics
http://journals.cambridge.org/PSC
Additional services for PS:

Political Science & Politics:

Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here

Cultural Surprises as Sources of Sudden, Big Policy Change
Brendon Swedlow
PS: Political Science & Politics / Volume 44 / Issue 04 / October 2011, pp 736  739
DOI: 10.1017/S1049096511001375, Published online: 18 October 2011

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1049096511001375
How to cite this article:
Brendon Swedlow (2011). Cultural Surprises as Sources of Sudden, Big Policy Change. PS: Political Science & Politics,44, pp 736739
doi:10.1017/S1049096511001375
Request Permissions : Click here

Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/PSC, IP address: 131.156.159.126 on 27 Aug 2012

...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

SY M P O S I U M
...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Cultural Surprises as Sources of
Sudden, Big Policy Change
Brendon Swedlow, Northern Illinois University

...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

A

major complaint against cultural theories is that
they cannot explain political change (Lockhart
1997). Cultural and institutional accounts of politics are also often seen as antagonistic (Chai
1997; Grendstad and Selle 1995; Lockhart 1999).
The cultural theory (CT) developed by Mary Douglas, Aaron
Wildavsky, and others (see, e.g., Schwarz and Thompson 1990;
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990), by contrast, oﬀers a
theory of culture that includes a theory of cultural change that
integrates institutions into its explanation of change (Lockhart 1997, 1999; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 69–81;
Wildavsky 1985). Moreover, CT can help specify the cultural
conditions for sudden, big institutional and policy change,
thereby, I argue, strengthening Frank Baumgartner and Bryan
Jones’s “punctuated equilibria” (PE) theory of change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2002). The plausibility of this CT of
PE change is illustrated in this article by using it to explain
dramatic changes in forest and wildlife management in the
Paciﬁc Northwest (PNW) (building on Swedlow 2002a, b, 2003,
2007, 2009, and 2011a, b).1
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, environmentalists argued
and federal judges agreed that federal land and wildlife management agencies were not doing enough to protect the northern spotted owl. These judges enjoined all federal timber sales
in the owl’s range in Washington, Oregon, and Northern California and ordered federal agencies to protect not just the
owl but ecosystems. President Clinton appointed a scientiﬁc
advisory committee to respond to these orders. The committee recommended and the President implemented a plan to
manage ecosystems on 24 million acres of federal land, an
area nearly six times the size of Connecticut, to protect not
just the owl but 1,000 other species associated with older forests. To achieve this, the plan called for a 75% permanent reduction in federal timber sales, which was expected to harm about
300 rural communities.
USING CULTURAL THEORY TO SPECIFY THE
INTERACTING IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS
OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA THEORY

In PE theory, certain interactions among ideas, interests, and
institutions produce negative feedback, dampening institutional and/or policy change, keeping it incremental or roughly
in equilibrium. Other interactions among ideas, interests, and
institutions produce positive feedback, leading to dramatic
institutional and/or policy changes, punctuating this equilibrium. Benjamin Cashore and Michael Howlett (2006, 2007)
use PE theory to explain the same dramatic changes in forest
and wildlife management in the PNW that are the subject of
this article. They emphasize institutional causes of PE, which
they believe are often slighted in PE analyses. Cashore and
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Howlett are correct that institutions are important in explaining PE change in this case, but their institutional account is
mis-speciﬁed in that it gives too much agency to “the law”
and too little to courts (Swedlow 2011a) and, as I argue here,
to cultural surprises.
More importantly, no scholar using PE theory has yet supplied a theory about the types of societal interests and governmental institutions that are involved in producing dramatic
policy changes. Consequently, PE scholars have not provided
a theory about what kinds of ideas cause diﬀerent types of
societal interests to demand, and social and political processes and governmental institutions to produce, dramatic policy changes. This article argues that CT can be used to specify
four basic kinds of societal interests and governmental institutions as well as to specify the sources of cultural surprises
that can lead to PE policy change.
In CT, ideas and interests are seen as reﬂections of beliefs
and values (Wildavsky 1991, 1994), whereas institutions are
viewed as manifestations of social and political relations (Chai
1997; Grendstad and Selle 1995; Lockhart 1999). Cultural theorists hypothesize that diﬀerent types of social and political
relations are accompanied by beliefs and values, including constructs of nature, that allow people to justify these relationships to each other. In other words, diﬀerent kinds of social
and political relations, beliefs, and values are thought to be
interdependent or functionally related. The corollary of this
hypothesis is that these diﬀerent kinds of relations, beliefs,
and values cannot be mixed and matched. To live one way and
think another is unsustainable, a pathway for cultural change.
Changes in beliefs and values are expected to lead to changes
in relations, and vice versa. Thus, relations constrain beliefs
and values, and beliefs and values constrain relations. Compatible relations, beliefs, and values are what Douglas and others call “cultures,” and compatible beliefs and values together
are what they term “cultural biases” or ideologies (Swedlow
2002b, 2008, 2011b; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990).
Douglas and colleagues’ next move is more controversial,
as it involves an attempt to characterize these cultural packages in a way that is parsimonious and still exhaustive of the
possibilities at a particular level of abstraction. Like many social
scientists, they think that much of the variation in social and
political relations is captured by the extent of individual autonomy and collectivism in those relations.2 Unlike other social
scientists, Douglas and colleagues believe that these conditions are independent of each other rather than inversely
related. Instead of lying on opposite ends of the same continuum, individual autonomy and collectivism vary separately
on their own dimensions. More of one condition does not
necessarily mean less of the other. These dimensions and the
resulting patterns of social relations are depicted in ﬁgure 1.
doi:10.1017/S1049096511001375
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Figure 1

Dimensions of Culture, Types of
Institutions, Political Values, and
Constructs of Nature

freedom, egalitarians value equality, hierarchs value order, and
fatalists value (good) luck (see ﬁgure 1; Coyle 1994; Ellis and
Thompson 1997; Swedlow 2008).
THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF NATURE AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN CULTURAL THEORY AND THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST

Michael Thompson has been particularly instrumental in characterizing the cultural constructs of nature in Douglas’s theory
(Schwarz and Thompson 1990, 8–13; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 26–33). Adapted from Thompson’s work, the constructs of nature that are functional for the diﬀerent patterns
of social relations are mapped on the dimensions of social
relations in ﬁgure 1, where a ball in a landscape represents the
constructs of nature:

Note: Figure 1 previously appeared in Swedlow 2011b.

This conceptual shift allows analysts to account for four,
rather than two, patterns of social and political relations. People in individualistic and fatalistic relations are not part of a collective undertaking, but individualists retain their autonomy,
while fatalists do not. People in egalitarian and hierarchical relations, meanwhile, are part of a collective undertaking, but egalitarians retain much more of their autonomy than hierarchs.
Hierarchical relations are highly structured, with everyone
and everything having his, her, and its place, represented by
an organizational pyramid in ﬁgure 1. In this cultural environment, legitimate decisions are made by persons with the proper
authority to make particular types of decisions: “the proper
authority decides.” 3 Individualistic relations, by contrast, are
highly ﬂuid, and subject to individual choice, represented by a
network in ﬁgure 1: “I decide.” Fatalistic relations, meanwhile, are tenuous and unreliable, driven by the “whim and
caprice” of others, represented by atomized individuals in ﬁgure 1: “others decide.” Finally, people in egalitarian relations
retain their autonomy by giving everyone an equal voice in
(and thus the power to veto) collective decisions: “we decide.”
The egalitarian desire to “have it all”—that is, to retain individual autonomy while acting collectively—is represented here
by something that looks like a chocolate chip cookie in ﬁgure 1.
Each of these four patterns of social and political relations
is hypothesized to be justiﬁed by and in turn justify (and make
plausible) particular kinds of values and beliefs. Not surprisingly, cultural theorists hypothesize that individualists value

• In the individualistic construct of nature, the ball is in a
deep pocket, diﬃcult to knock out: this represents nature
as benign, resilient, or even robust or cornucopian.4
• The egalitarian construct of nature is most nearly the
opposite of the individualistic: the ball is perched precariously on top of a pinnacle; the slightest disturbance will
send it irretrievably downhill: this represents nature as
fragile or ephemeral.
• The hierarchical construct of nature combines these two
constructs: the ball is in a shallow pocket; small disturbances will not dislodge it, but large ones will; nature is
construed as being benign or resilient within limits,
beyond which it is fragile, ephemeral, or unpredictable.5
• In the fatalistic construct of nature, the ball is on a ﬂat surface; it can roll in any direction; this represents the unpredictability or capriciousness of nature; sometimes benign,
resilient, or even robust or cornucopian, sometimes fragile or ephemeral, without discernable rhyme or reason.
The scientiﬁc debate regarding owls and ecosystems in the
PNW can be characterized as an argument between environmentalists and their academic sympathizers, on the one hand,
and federal and industry scientists, on the other, over how
shallow the pocket was, or whether the ball was in a pocket at
all. However, federal scientists came fairly close to arguing
that ecosystems were unpredictable—being “not only more
complex than we think, but more complex than we can think”—
while scientists working for industry argued for the resiliency
and adaptability of the owl and ecosystems. The debate eﬀectively concluded when environmentalists and their academic
sympathizers persuaded federal judges that the ball was teetering on the lip of the pocket or, alternatively, about to fall oﬀ
its pinnacle perch.
From these constructs of nature it is also possible to deduce
the types of environmental policies that each of the four cultural types will pursue. Individualists will oﬀer a hands-on,
transformative approach, which is indeed what the timber
industry advocated: “Tell us what owl habitat looks like and
we’ll grow it.” They suggested building nest boxes and breeding owls in captivity and then shipping the owls between habitat areas rather than retaining old trees with nesting cavities
and providing forested migratory routes for these birds. Egalitarians will take a hands-oﬀ, “tread lightly” approach, which
PS • October 2011 737
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is what environmentalists wanted when they advocated the
complete halt of timber harvests that was nearly achieved.
Hierarchs will be activist, but only to a point that is sustainable, which was the approach the US Forest Service has historically taken with respect to timber harvesting. Fatalists will
remain passive in the face of nature’s ﬁckle moods, a position
that (in addition to the egalitarian “tread lightly” approach)
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the approach taken by President Clinton’s scientiﬁc advisers.
CULTURAL SURPRISES, PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA, AND
POLICY CHANGE IN CULTURAL THEORY AND THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST

“But if preferences and perception are socially constructed in
such a way as to justify particular patterns of social relations,
how does change ever occur?,” ask Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky in their seminal reﬁnement of
Douglas’s theory (1990, 69). “Much the same way,” they answer,
“as scientiﬁc theories lose and gain adherents: the cumulative
impact of successive anomalies or surprises.” Anomalies and
surprises occur because “nature, for all its accommodating
ways, does not meekly accept every cultural construction we
try to impose on it, and, in ﬁghting back, it generates a countervailing force: the natural destruction of culture . . .”
In other words, cultural theorists locate a catalyst for scientiﬁc, cultural, and policy change in surprises generated by
encounters with nature in which nature displays properties or
reveals characteristics that are at odds with scientiﬁcally or
culturally generated expectations. Stipulating the world is one
way and ﬁnding out that it actually appears to be another
leads to a variety of predictable consequences, which can lead
to such changes 6 (see also Coyle and Wildavsky 1987; Lockhart 1997; Lodge and Wegrich 2011, this issue; Swedlow 2011c,
this issue; Wildavsky 1985).
One area where the natural destruction of science, culture,
and policy appeared to occur in the PNW was in the inﬂuence
changing scientiﬁc understandings of older forests had on forest and wildlife science and management. The US Forest Service, which manages most of the federal lands in the region, had
been an exemplary hierarchically organized federal agency since
its founding in the early 1900s. It championed scientiﬁc management to produce a sustained yield of timber by managing
forests much as one would manage any other crop. The Forest
Service called for the harvest of old-growth forests not set aside
as Wilderness Areas or National Parks because it wanted to
replace these slower-growing, decadent, diseased “biological
deserts” with faster growing, healthier, younger stands.
Research beginning in the early 1970s challenged the Forest
Service’s view that old-growth forests were lifeless “cellulose
cemeteries” that needed to be harvested. Researchers at the H.J.
Andrews Experimental Forest in Oregon found that these older
forests were home to a wide variety of interdependent life forms.
Proceeding roughly in parallel with the research of the H.J.
Andrews team was the research of wildlife biologist Eric Forsman on the relationship between the northern spotted owl and
old-growth forests. Environmental groups were excited by this
research because it gave them additional reasons to value and,
with respect to the owl, a legal means to preserve older forests.
738 PS • October 2011

In other words, research on old-growth forest ecosystems,
and speciﬁcally on the relationship between spotted owls and
old-growth, constructed nature in ways that were functional
for egalitarian environmental groups. The development of this
research and environmental groups’ interest in this research
thus is one signiﬁcant area where political cultural conditions
were ripe for punctuated equilibria in policy change to occur.
Accordingly, after obtaining further supportive owl habitat and population modeling analyses from another scientist,
environmentalists began suing the federal land and wildlife
management agencies on behalf of the northern spotted owl.
They argued, and federal judges agreed, that federal land and
wildlife managers were not doing enough to protect the owl,
violating several environmental laws.
No judge played a more signiﬁcant role in facilitating the
rise of ecosystem management in the PNW than district court
Judge William Dwyer. Not only was he the ﬁrst to enjoin federal timber sales to protect the owl, but his injunction against
the Forest Service fundamentally altered the politics of the
issue. This temporary but 100% reduction in sales [when
extended to Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands by
another judge’s injunction] created the policy window for President Clinton’s scientists to propose and the President to implement a 75% permanent reduction in sales.
Judge Dwyer also ordered the agencies to develop plans that
would protect not only the owl but “biological communities.”
This order implied that only an owl management plan that also
managed ecosystems would be suﬃcient to lift the injunction.
This order was the result of considerable judicial activism, with
Judge Dwyer ﬁnding a mandate for ecosystem management in
regulations written by Forest Service biologists. These regulations required the agency to maintain “viable populations of
vertebrates” on agency lands, arguably going beyond the Endangered Species Act’s focus on the recovery of individual species,
but not requiring ecosystem management per se. Judge Dwyer
also read another environmental law to require assessment of
the environmental impact of owl management on agency lands,
and, furthermore, he allowed the Clinton administration to
extend ecosystem management to BLM lands and to invertebrates on both BLM and Forest Service lands.
Judge Dwyer barely acknowledged industry experts in his
opinions that lead to the injunction of Forest Service timber
sales, but he lent an especially sympathetic ear to critiques of
agency owl plans oﬀered by scientists who testiﬁed on behalf
of environmentalists. The conservation strategy developed by
the land and wildlife management agencies aﬀorded vastly
more protection for the owl than set-asides for owl pairs, and
Judge Dwyer initially was impressed by this strategy. But Judge
Dwyer was soon persuaded that the agency conservation plan
might not go far enough when government biologists produced an analysis that suggested that owl populations were
declining faster than previously thought. Then, academic scientists testiﬁed that the owl’s decline might even be worse
than that, having passed a threshold from which the owl could
not recover. This led Judge Dwyer to enjoin Forest Service
timber sales.
The spotted owl cases, relying on scientiﬁcally and culturally surprising new ﬁndings about the owl’s old-growth
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dependence and decline, thus resulted in a dramatic, PE transformation of federal land and wildlife management in an egalitarian direction. Judicial injunctions of federal timber sales
reﬂected the egalitarian view of nature as fragile, while court
orders to manage biological communities, and President Clinton’s eﬀort to manage ecosystems, institutionalized the policies and social and political relationships that egalitarians
preferred.
Thus, CT provides a plausible speciﬁcation of the kinds of
ideas, interests, and institutions that interact to produce PE
change, as well as a plausible speciﬁcation of the kinds of cultural surprises that can lead to PE change. CT consequently
signiﬁcantly strengthens the PE theory of policy and institutional change. 䡲
NOTES
I thank Matt Grossman, Hank Jenkins-Smith, Charles Lockhart, and Chandra
Hunter Swedlow for valuable comments in the preparation of this article. Although
I was not able to implement all of their suggestions, I look forward to addressing
many of these in my future work. This research was supported by the Bradley and
Earhart Foundations and by the Institute for the Study of the Environment, Sustainability, and Energy at Northern Illinois University.
1. Due to space constraints, this article focuses more on cultural surprises as
sources of PE change in policy than in institutions, although sudden, big
changes of both kinds occurred as the result of the cultural surprises in this
case. See Swedlow 2011b for a cultural analysis of institutional changes
in the US Forest Service and its relationship to the US Fish and Wildlife Service that were coproduced with the policy changes analyzed here.
2. By the extent of collectivization, I mean the extent to which those in a
pattern of social relations make Us versus Them distinctions, i.e., the extent to which the pattern is deﬁned by an external group boundary. By the
extent of individual autonomy, I mean the extent to which individuals in a
pattern of social relations are free from coercion and are free to act as they
please; individual autonomy implies some personal power or eﬃcacy. The
following description of Douglas’s cultural theory tracks that found in
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990) fairly closely. However, I have
relabeled their dimensions to make their theory “translate” better into
terms that social scientists already understand. Thus, the extent of collectivization in a social organization corresponds to the extent of “group” in
their formulation, while the extent of individual autonomy corresponds
(inversely) to the extent of “grid.”
3. These characterizations of appropriate decision-making authority are
adapted from Lotte Jensen (1999).
4. Thompson claims “nature resilient” is a “meta-myth” that subsumes the
other four constructs of nature (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 26,
29–32).
5. Thompson calls this “nature perverse/tolerant” (Schwarz and Thompson
1990, 9).
6. See ﬁgure 4 in Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990, 71), for a typology
of cultural changes; see also Coyle and Wildavsky (1987); Lockhart (1997);
and Wildavsky (1985).
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